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The following is an update on Kansas legislative activity and case law 
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 2016. 
II. Legislative And Regulatory Developments 
On October 23, 2015, Kansas Administrative Regulation § 82-3-304, 
Tests of Gas Wells, was amended to no longer require an annual shut-in 
pressure test for gas wells, in addition to other changes detailed below.1    
The amendment made three main changes to the statute. First, it 
lengthened the amount of time operators have to submit initial 24-hour 
shut-in pressure tests on new gas wells from 30 days to 120 days. Second, it 
increased the amount of gas a well must be capable of producing before 
requiring certain annual testing requirements to 500 mcf per day. Finally, it 
eliminated the need for operators to file annual exemptions for gas wells 
incapable of producing enough gas to trigger the annual testing 
requirements, which eliminated the need for an annual shut-in pressure 
test.2   
These amendments were made for several reasons. Production at most 
gas wells is low enough that the tests typically had no effect on the 
minimum production allowable provided for by regulation at each well. 
Also, shut-in pressures are low enough that the data gathered no longer had 
much value. Another reason for the amendments was because low field 
pressures coupled with the nature of the tests can cause negative effects on 
production. The principal economic impact of these amendments will be the 
savings to operators from no longer needing to file annual exemption forms 
with the State Corporation Commission and no longer needing to conduct 
annual shut-in pressure tests to obtain the exemptions.3     
Although outside of the applicable time frame of this article, it is worth 
noting that effective July 1, 2015, SB 124 was enacted to regulate land-
spreading of solid waste generated by drilling oil and gas wells. The bill 
requires the sellers of any property where land spreading has occurred 
within the previous three years to disclose the land-spreading to any 
potential purchaser of the property prior to closing.4 
                                                                                                             
 1. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-304 (2015). 
 2. KANSAS CITIZENS UTILITY RATEPAYER BOARD, Kansas Corporation Commission––
K.A.R. § 82-3-304 (2015), http://www.crrb.ks.gov/regulation-detail/2015/06/02/kansas-
corporation-commission---k.a.r.-82-3-304.  
 3. Id. 
 4. S.B. 124, 2015 Leg., 1st Sess. (KS. 2015). 
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III. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas 
In Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, the Supreme Court of 
Kansas (“the Court”) addressed (1) whether an operator’s duty to bear the 
expense of making gas marketable is satisfied when the operator delivers 
raw natural gas to purchasers at the well in good faith transactions; and (2) 
whether the operator may take into account the deductions and adjustments 
identified in third-party purchase agreements when calculating royalties 
owed to the lessors.5  
This was a class action for underpayment of royalties claimed under 
twenty-five oil and gas leases entered into between 1944 and 1991, of 
which Oil Producers, Inc. (“the Operator”) is the lessee-operator.6 The 
royalty provisions in the leases called for the royalty calculations to be 
made based on a sale of gas at the well, or on the market value at the well.7 
Natural gas coming from the ground in its raw condition must be processed 
before it is suitable for interstate pipelines.8 The Operator lacked the means 
to independently process the raw natural gas and make it suitable for 
transport, so it entered into third-party purchase agreements where the 
purchaser did the processing of the raw natural gas.9 The expense of 
processing the raw natural gas was deducted from the purchase price the 
third-party purchaser paid to the Operator, and the Operator had been 
deducting a proportionate share of that expense from the royalties paid to 
the class of lessors (“the Class”).10   
At the lower court, the Class argued (1) the royalty payments should be 
free of such deductions because the “marketable condition rule” places the 
burden of making gas marketable solely on the operator;11 (2) raw natural 
gas is not marketable at the well since it was unsuitable for delivery into 
interstate pipelines;12 and (3) the deductions in the purchase contracts 
simply represented expenses to make the gas marketable, which was the 
                                                                                                             
 5. 352 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Kan. 2015). 
 6. Id. at 1034. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1035. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1036-37. 
 12. Id.  
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Operator’s obligation alone.13 The Operator argued its royalty payments 
were proper because they were calculated on 100% of its actual proceeds 
from its sale of the gas at the wellhead.14 
 The lower court concluded the Operator’s obligation prohibits 
deductions from royalties except as might be expressly authorized in the 
lease, noting no such language appears. The Operator petitioned the 
Supreme Court of Kansas for review, which was granted.15 
As the Court framed it, the primary issue in this case was whether an 
operator is “solely responsible under the common-law marketable condition 
rule for the costs and adjustments taken by third-party purchasers.”16 
Under Kansas law, a lease imposes on an operator an implied duty to 
market the minerals produced. To satisfy this duty, an operator has to 
market its production at reasonable terms within a reasonable time 
following production.17  
In this case, the Operator claimed its duty was fulfilled when it entered 
into the purchase agreements for sale of the gas at the wellhead and that the 
pricing formulas in the purchase agreements gave both itself and the royalty 
owners the opportunity to share in higher prices received for the gas as it 
got closer to the consumer.18  
The Class argued “the ‘marketable condition rule,’ which is an offshoot 
of the implied duty to market, imposes on the operators the obligation to 
make gas marketable at the operators’ own expense.”19 The Class further 
claimed that “raw natural gas sold at the well is not marketable as a matter 
of law or fact until it is processed and enters an interstate pipeline, so its 
royalties cannot be reduced by the processing costs that are set out as 
deductions in the purchase agreements.”20 
The Court turned to prior Kansas cases for guidance on this issue. In 
Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co.,  the lease required the operator to pay for gas 
sold, “as royalty 1/8 of the proceeds of the sale thereof at the mouth of the 
well.” 21 The operator had built a compressor station on the leased premises 
to collect and compress the gas, which allowed the operator to sell the gas 
                                                                                                             
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 1036. 
 15. Id. at 1038. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1039-40 (citing Smith v. Amoco Production Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001)). 
 18. Id. at 1039. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
 21. 388 P.2d 602, 605 (Kan. 1964). 
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and sought contribution from the royalty owners for the compression 
costs.22 In holding that the deductions of the expense of the compressor 
station from the royalty payments were improper, the court in Gilmore 
reasoned that the compression simply “made the gas marketable and was in 
satisfaction of the duties of the lease [operator] to do so.”23  
In Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co., the facts were nearly identical to 
those in Gilmore, and the Court similarly held that the operator could not 
deduct the compression cost from the gross proceeds in calculating the 
royalties. 24 
In Sternbe*rger v. Marathon Oil Co., 25 the lease language also required 
the operator to pay royalties based on “the market price at the well for gas 
sold or used.”26 As in the prior cases, the operator built a compressor and 
deducted a proportionate share of that expense from the royalties paid to the 
lessors. However, in this case the third-party purchasers were unwilling to 
build a gathering pipeline system to access the well, so the operator built 
one at his own expense. The operator then deducted a proportionate share 
of said expense from the royalties paid to the lessors.27 The court in 
Sternberger held that the operator could not deduct the compression cost 
from its gross proceeds in computing royalties, but could deduct a 
proportionate share of the expense of building the gathering pipeline system 
from the royalty payments because the royalties were based on the market 
value of the gas at the well, and the operators had done nothing to prepare 
the wellhead gas for sale other than move it from the place where its value 
was to be determined (the well) to the purchaser.28 
Taking these three cases into consideration, the Court in Fawcett 
reasoned that (1) when gas is sold at the well it has been marketed; and (2) 
when the operator is required to pay royalty on its proceeds from such sales, 
the operator may not deduct any pre-sale expenses required to make the gas 
acceptable to the third-party purchaser.29  
The Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the 
case to the district court, holding that “when a lease provides for royalties 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. at 604. 
 23. Id. at 606. 
 24. Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1 (1964). 
 25. Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (1995). 
 26. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 352 P.3d 1032, 1040-41 (Kan. 2015) 
(quoting Sternberger, 894 P.2d at 793). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1041. 
 29. Id.  
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based on a share of proceeds from the sale of gas at the well, and the gas is 
sold at the well, the operator’s duty to bear the expense of making the gas 
marketable does not, as a matter of law, extend beyond that geographical 
point to post-sale expenses.”30 
B. Appellate Activity 
Oxy USA, Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC 
In Oxy USA, Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC, the Court of Appeals of Kansas 
addressed, inter alia: (1) whether production within a unit, but outside of 
the subject property, constitutes “production” as the term is used in a deed 
reservation that fails to define “production”; and (2) whether failing to take 
legal action to have the holder of an expired term ousted from the property 
constitutes acquiescence and estops the reversionary interest holder from 
claiming their reversionary interest.31   
In April 1945, Frank Luther conveyed a tract of land containing 160 
acres, subject to an existing oil and gas lease (“the Luther lease”), unto 
E.W. Rahenkamp, reserving a one-half interest in the mineral rights for a 
period of twenty years “or as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals is 
produced therefrom.”32 
The Luther lease was unitized and consolidated with neighboring 
leaseholds and oil and gas was thereafter continuously produced on those 
neighboring leaseholds.33 However, no oil and gas was produced directly 
on the Luther lease lands from March 27, 1945 until 2009, when Oxy USA, 
Inc. began producing oil and/or gas from the Tice Cattle #3 well.34   
Through a series of conveyances: (i) Alice LaVelle King (“King”) is the 
current owner of the interest conveyed unto E.W. Rahenkap in April 1945; 
(ii) the one-half mineral interest reserved unto Frank Luther became vested 
in multiple parties, inter alia, those parties identified herein as “the Luther 
mineral interest holders”; and (iii) Oxy USA, Inc. became the successor 
lessee under the Luther lease.35  
Oxy USA, Inc. was unable to determine who it should be making royalty 
payments to under the Luther lease so it filed an interpleader and quiet title 
action to determine who currently holds the mineral rights to the property.36 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id.  
 31. 360 P.3d 457 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015). 
 32. Id. at 459. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 460. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Luther mineral 
interest holders, holding that King’s reversionary interest was triggered in 
1972, but that her claim was untimely and, as a result, she acquiesced in the 
continuation of the Luther mineral interest.37 King appealed, and the Luther 
mineral interest holders cross-appealed the decision of the district court.38   
The first issue the Kansas Court of Appeals (“the Court”) examined was 
whether production within a unit, but outside of the subject property, 
qualifies as “production” in the context of a term reservation for a stated 
term of years “or as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals is produced 
therefrom.”39  
 The Court first addressed this issue in Smith v. Home Royalty 
Association, Inc.,40 reasoning that the terms of a lease could not control the 
interpretation given to the terms of a deed, and therefore, if a deed does not 
define production to include a unitized or consolidated lease agreement, 
then the term “production” in the deed must only refer to production 
occurring on the subject property.41  
The Court revisited the issue eight years later in Classen v. Federal Land 
Bank of Wichita42, overturning Smith and holding that “production within 
the meaning of a defeasible term mineral interest included production 
occurring on unitized or consolidated lease property.”43 
Ten years after Classen, the Court once more revisited the issue in 
Kneller v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita.44 This time the question before 
the Court was whether the rule stated in Classen should be applied 
retroactively to situations where the term of a defeasible mineral interest 
had expired prior to the Classen decision.45 The Court held that Classen 
should not be applied retroactively, thus leaving Smith to control in 
situations where the term of the reservation had expired prior to the Classen 
decision.46 
Because the term reservation in Oxy USA, Inc. expired prior to Classen, 
and there was no production on the subject property during the twenty-year 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 460. 
 39. Id. at 457, 461.  
 40. 498 P.2d 98, 101-02 (Kan. 1972). 
 41. Oxy USA, Inc., 360 P.3d at 461. 
 42. 617 P.2d 1255, 1257-59 (Kan. 1980). 
 43. Oxy USA, Inc., 360 P.3d at 461-62 (citing Classen, 617 P.2d at 1252-64). 
 44. 799 P.2d 485, 489-90 (Kan. 1990). 
 45. Oxy USA, Inc., 360 P.3d at 461-62 (citing Kneller, 799 P.2d 485, 489-90). 
 46. Id. 
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term, the Court held that Smith should control. Therefore, the Court held 
that the reversionary interest was triggered and reverted to King.47 
The Court also examined whether failing to take legal action to have the 
holder of an expired term ousted from the property constitutes acquiescence 
and estops the reversionary interest holder from claiming their reversionary 
interest.48  
Acquiescence is defined as “an assertion of rights inconsistent with past 
conduct, silence by those who ought to speak, or situations wherein it 
would be unconscionable to permit a person to maintain a position 
inconsistent with one in which [the person] has acquiesced.”49  
The Luther mineral interest holders argue that King’s failure to take legal 
action since 1972 to claim her reversionary interest constitutes 
acquiescence and precludes her from now claiming ownership of the 
reversionary interest.50   
The Court focused on the facts in the present case to determine this issue. 
Because there was no production on the subject property until 2009, King 
lacked any specific incentive to quiet title against the Luther mineral 
interest holders unless she planned to sell the property.51 The Court found 
King’s lack of action to not be inconsistent with her present claim of 
ownership.52 Therefore, the Court held that a claim of acquiescence does 
not apply to the reversionary interest of King.53  
The Court of Appeals of Kansas reversed and remanded the decision of 
the district court with instructions to enter judgment for King. 
C. Trial Activity 
None reported. 
 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 462. 
 49. Id. at 464 (quoting Harrin v. Brown Realty Co., 602 P.2d 79, 84 (Kan. 1979)). 
 50. Id. at 462. 
 51. Id. at 464. 
 52. Id. at 465. 
 53. Id. 
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